5Greplay: a 5G Network Traffic Fuzzer - Application to Attack Injection

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Outline

1 Introduction

2 Background

3 Architecture

4 Experimental Evaluation

- Malformed packets against open-source 5G cores in real-time
- NAS-5G SMC Replay attack
- High-bandwidth traffic generation
- 5 Conclusion
 - Future works

Introduction: 5G key enabling technologies

- Software defined networks (SDN)
- Network functions virtualization (NFV)
- Mobile Edge computing (MEC)
- Network Slicing (NS)




Figure 1: 5G Architecture by ENISA [5]

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This requires...

The creation of **new sets of security test cases** and **tools** specifically targeting 5G security concerns

SoA: Testing the 5G

Threat and vulnerability reports	Security test cases	Application
ENISA [5]	3GPP Catalogue of General Security assurance requirements [1]	Python Scapy
3GPP [1]		Tcpreplay
Academic research [3, 4]	3GPP 5G Security Assurance Specification of the AMF [2]	5Greplay
Industrial reports [7, 6]		

Table 1: Testing in 5G previous works

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Challenge: The testing of 5G network components and IDSs

5Greplay

An open-source solution to perform fuzz testing of 5G networks, allowing to forward network packets from one NIC to another with or without modifications.

http://5greplay.org

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Definition

Let **P** denote a **5G** network packet in a PCAP file or a specific real-time flow of network packets. **5Greplay** performs **fuzz testing** in 5G VNFs, IDSs, apps, etc, relying in the following operators...

Atomic operator	Description
$DEL_PKT(P)$	Delete a packet
$CH_ATTR(P)$	Change a specific attribute of a message header
$ORD(P1, P2)^*$	Exchange the order of two consecutive packets
$DUP_PKT(P)$	Duplicate packet

 Table 2: 5Greplay atomic operators. *Currently not implemented

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General Architecture




Figure 2: 5Greplay main process. Incoming network packets are filtered according to predefined rules that determine which packets will be modified, forwarded, or dropped before being sent to the output NIC

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Scenario 1: Sending malformed packets against open-source 5G cores in real-time

Objective

Create and **send malformed packets** to a 5G core network, to evaluate robustness against unexpected entries at run-time.




Figure 3: Sending malformed NGAP packets against free5GC

Scenario 1: Sending malformed packets against open-source 5G cores in real-time

Evaluation of 5G core simulators

- **free5GC** show an AMF warning, but the simulator keep running and allowed new UE connections
- **Open5GS** was not able to handle this packet and the simulator crashed

05/12 17:23:47.069: [gmm] INF0: [suci-0-901-70-0000-0-000000000] SUCI (../src/amf/gmm-handler.c:72) 05/12 17:23:47.069: [gmm] ERROR: Invalid service name [nudm-sdm] (../src/amf/context.c:1045) 05/12 17:23:47.070: [gmm] WARNING: gmm_state_authentication: should not be reached. (../src/amf/gmm-sm.c:625) 05/12 17:23:47.070: [core] FATAL: backtrace() returned 9 addresses (../lib/core/ogs-abort.c:37) /usr/bin/open5gs-amfd(+0x17418) [0x55f750b1d418] /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libogscore.so.2(ogs_fsm_dispatch+0x16) [0x7ff86bb4ec76] /usr/bin/open5gs-amfd(+0x157550b1b4e] /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libogscore.so.2(logs_fsm_dispatch+0x16) [0x7ff86bb4ec76] /usr/bin/x86_64-linux-gnu/libogscore.so.2(+0xd718) [0x7ff86bb46718] /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpthread.so.0(+0x76db) [0x7ff86bf416db] /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpthread.so.0(+0x76db) [0x7ff86bf416db]

Figure 4: open5GS AMF log when receiving a malformed NGAP packet

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Scenario 1: Sending malformed packets against open-source 5G cores in real-time

Evaluation of 5Greplay

Replay and **modify** 5G network packets in a **online way** by using the fuzz operator CH_ATTR(P).

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Scenario 2: NAS-5G SMC Replay attack

Objective

Perform security tests by modifying and injecting network traffic into a specif target. Test proposed in the **3GPP TS33.512** [2].




Figure 5: Sending malformed NGAP packets against free5GC

Scenario 2: NAS-5G SMC Replay attack

Evaluation of free5Gc

The AMF identified the replayed packets as not belonging to the same NGAP security context. **free5Gc** AMF **passed** the test.

2021-05-19T08:40:28-07:00 [INF0][AMF][GMM][AMF UE NGAP ID:7][SUPI:imsi-208930000000003] Send Security Mode Command 2021-05-19T08:40:28-07:00 [INF0] [AMF] [NGAP] [192.168.49.4:35118] [AMF UE NGAP ID:7] Send Downlink Nas Transport 2021-05-19T08:40:28-07:00 [INF0] [AMF] [NGAP] [192.168.49.4:35118] Handle Uplink Nas Transport 2021-05-19T08:40:28-07:00 [INFO][AMF][NGAP][192.168.49.4:35118][AMF UE NGAP ID:7] Uplink NAS Transport (RAN UE NGAP ID: 2) 2021-05-19T08:40:28-07:00 [INFO] [AMF] [GMM] [AMF_UE_NGAP_ID:7] [SUPI:imsi-20893000000003] Handle Security Mode Complete 2021-05-19T08:40:28-07:00 [INF0] [AMF] [GMM] [AMF UE NGAP ID:7] [SUPI:imsi-20893000000003] Handle InitialRegistration 2021-05-19T08:40:28-07:00 [INF0][NRF][DSCV] Handle NFDiscoveryRequest [INF0] [AMF] [NGAP] Create a new NG connection for: 192.168.49.4/172.16.151.12/10.45.0.1:49183 2021-05-19T08:40:28-07:00 [INF0] [AMF] [NGAP] [192.168.49.4/172.16.151.12/10.45.0.1:49183] Handle Uplink Nas Transport 2021-05-19T08:40:28-07:00 2021-05-19T08:40:28-07:00 [ERR0] [AMF] [NGAP] [192.168.49.4/172.16.151.12/10.45.0.1:49183] No UE Context[RanUeNgapID: 2] [INF0] [AMF] [NGAP] [192.168.49.4/172.16.151.12/10.45.0.1:49183] Handle Uplink Nas Transport 2021-05-19T08:40:28-07:00 2021-05-19T08:40:28-07:00 [ERR0] [AMF] [NGAP] [192,168,49,4/172,16,151,12/10,45,0,1:49183] No UE Context[RanUeNgapID: 2]

Figure 6: Free5Gc AMF log when replaying Security Mode Complete messages (SMC)

Scenario 2: NAS-5G SMC Replay attack

Evaluation of 5Greplay

We tested the utility of 5Greplay to perform standardized security tests by using the fuzz operator CH_ATTR(P).

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Scenario 3: High-bandwidth traffic generation

Objective

Scalability of 5Greplay^a. DoS attacks or stress tests on open5GS and free5GC.

 $^a{\rm while}$ using only one thread on a Intel Ethernet Network Adapter X710



Scenario 3: High-bandwidth traffic generation

Evaluation of 5G core simulators

	#packet copies	Avg. packets/s	Avg. kbit/s
open5Gs	1780	509.5	834
free5GC	3000	594.9	974

Table 3: Endurance of 5G AMF services against traffic replaying

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Scenario 3: High-bandwidth traffic generation

Evaluation of 5Greplay

5Greplay can be used to test the robustness of 5G core services by using in the fuzz operator $DUP_PKT(P)$.

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The tool is capable to...

- Receive online and offline entries
- Systematically create and send malformed packets that are accepted by 5G simulators
- Evaluate the robustness against unexpected entries of a target
- Perform 5G security test cases
- Stress testing a target

- Defining new 5G attacks that can be performed by the tool
- Techniques to manage encrypted traffic
- Implement and test new ways to alter packets, such as changing the order of two packets
- Experimental evaluation will be performed on other 5G interfaces

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Thanks Q&A

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